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Abstract. A design-centric modeling approach was proposed to model
the behavior of the physical process controlled by an Industrial Con-
trol System (ICS) and study the cascading effects of data-oriented at-
tacks. A threat model was used as input to guide the construction of
the model where control components which are within the adversary’s
intent and capabilities are extracted. The relevant control components
are subsequently modeled together with their control dependencies and
operational design specifications. The approach was demonstrated and
validated on a water treatment testbed. Attacks were simulated on the
testbed model where its resilience to attacks was evaluated using pro-
posed metrics such as Impact Ratio and Time-to-Critical-State. From the
analysis of the attacks, design strengths and weaknesses were identified
and design improvements were recommended to increase the testbed’s
resilience to attacks.
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1 Introduction
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are systems that comprise of networked com-
putational and communication devices that interacts with the physical environ-
ment it is deployed in. Industrial Control Systems (ICS) belong to the family
of CPS and consist of controllers, sensors and actuators which are used across
various industries to monitor and control physical processes. With advances in
technology, the operators demand for modernization of these systems for im-
proved efficiency and performance by improving connectivity, monitoring and
control capabilities [9]. However, this also increases the attack surface of these
systems, making them more vulnerable to cyber attacks. Attacks on CPSs have
the ability to cause damage to the physical environment, bringing about harm
to infrastructure and human lives [2,8,10].
Acknowledging the need to address security of CPSs, there is increasing
research on securing CPSs from different aspects such as hardware security,
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network-level intrusions detection and more recently, phyiscs-based attack de-
tection [18,6]. Securing CPSs serves to protect the operation of the system, but to
achieve the desired disruptive results, an attacker requires understanding about
workings of the system such as control logic and failure modes in order to max-
imise damage [13]. Hence, there is a need to study the interaction of attackers
with the system and how the attacks translate to impact on the physical process
or environment.
Process systems controlled by ICS are complex with numerous sub-processes
that may span across vast geographical areas and are inter-connected either
physically or by the control logic of the controllers in the ICS. As such, any
attacks on individual or subset of components would result in cascading effect
within the system. As these systems are safety-critical, an important aspect of
security research is to study the impact and consequences of attacks on the
physical environment [10,13]. With better understanding of the interaction of
adversary with the physical system and how the impact of attack propagates, it
can help in the design of defences that improves the system’s resilience to cyber
attacks.
While many research focus on securing CPSs from attacks, there exists a
need to understand and quantify the impact of attacks on these systems post-
detection. To this end, this paper presents a framework to construct a process
model to simulate the process dynamics and propagation of attacks across the
sub-processes of a process system. Quantitative metric to measure the resilience
of the system was adopted from the resilience study of networked infrastruc-
ture that uses performance degradation as a measure of impact [15,16,14]. We
also quantified the ability of the system to withstand attacks before an unde-
sirable consequence occurs by measuring the time to critical state whilst under
attack [3].
1.1 Contributions
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
1. A generic framework that uses a threat model to guide the construction of
the model to evaluate cascading impact of attacks on Process Systems.
2. Design driven modeling approach that combines the system’s control strat-
egy and operating specifications to model the process dynamics.
3. Systematic approach to evaluate the impact of attacks and measure the
resilience of the system under various attack scenarios.
We applied the proposed framework on the Secure Water Treatment Testbed
(SWaT) [11] to validate the modeling approach. Subsequently, we attempted
to quantify the impact of attacks by providing a measurement of the system’s
resilience to the disruptions under the various attack scenarios.
2 Related Work
In this section, we review some of the related work on approaches undertaken
to measure and analyse impact of cyber attacks on cyber-physical systems.
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Cardenas et al. in [2] demonstrated the use of process models to study the
interaction between control system and the physical processes. The model of a
single stage chemical reactor process was used to determine sensors to attack
in order to drive the system to an unsafe state. The approach taken was to
perform integrity and denial of service attacks on all sensors to evaluate each
attack’s ability to drive the system to an unsafe state. Krotofil and Cardenas
in [8] also investigated the impact of attacks on control systems using process
models. Attacks were simulated on a single-stage chemical reactor process and
empirical analysis on the effects of attacks on physical process behavior were
conducted. These works, however, do not discuss the coupling effects of attacks
that results from control loop dependencies.
In [5], Genge et al. proposed a methodology of assessing the impact of at-
tacks by measuring the cross-covariances of control variables before and after
the system is perturbed. While this method provides insights on how the impact
of attack propagates through the system via the relationship between control
variables, it does not translate to the consequence of attacks on system perfor-
mance.
Milosevic et al. in [12] proposed a framework to measure impact of attack on
stochastic linear control systems using the infinity norm of critical states over
a time window. The impact is measured by how much the critical states of the
system deviates from the steady state over a period of time steps while remaining
undetected by an anomaly detector. The impact metric provides information of
the extent to which the system is perturbed during an attack but does not give
resolution on the impact on the physical process.
In [13], Orojloo and Azgomi proposed a modeling approach that considers
the systems dynamics and control dependencies between the various components
in the cyber-physical systems. The model built was used to perform sensitivity
analysis to understand the system behaviour under various attack scenarios,
providing insights to vulnerable control loops. The impact on system’s physical
parameters by attacks on specific components on the system was subsequently
used to evaluate the component’s criticality for successful attacks.
Adepu and Mathur in [1] studied the response of a water treatment plant to
single point attacks. The attack propagation in terms of number of components
in the system were affected were analyzed. System behavior such as changes
in physical process metrics during attacks were investigated. The results of the
study were used to propose attack detection mechanisms that were based on
physical properties of the system.
Comparing the works that focuses on measuring impact of attacks on cyber-
physical systems, we identified that there is a gap in providing an approach to
quantitatively assess cascading impact of attacks across the multiple processes
within a system and provide measurements of resilience of the system to attacks
with respect to safety and performance.
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3 Approach
In this section, we outline the approach taken to build a threat intent guided
model of a cyber-physical system which incorporates the interaction of process’s
control strategy with the physical process and the attacker’s capabilities. This
allows us to conduct simulations of attacks on the physical process via the control
system to analyse how the impact of attacks propagates in the system and study
the system’s resilience to cyber attacks.
3.1 Threat Modeling
Threat modeling starts by describing the intention and capabilities of the at-
tacker and the output would be a subset of physical components and related
control strategies that the adversary would be able to attack and affect.
Definition 1. We define the intention of the attacker as adversarial goals that
the attacker wants to achieve from an attack. We assume that impact of attack
can be observed and translated to affected operational metrics. The operational
metrics affected can then be mapped onto a set of sensors that measures these
metrics.
The subset of sensors Smetric that measure the impact of attack directly
related to the attacker’s goal is a subset of all the sensors in the system S.
Smetric = {s1, s2, ...sn},∀i = 1, .., n ∧ si ∈ S (1)
With the knowledge of the design of the control strategy for normal oper-
ations, we are able to extract control statements (CS) that relates Smetric,i to
other components in the system.
CSj = < smetric,i, SCS , ACS , Cond >,∀j = 1, ...,m (2)
where :
m is the total number of control statements
SCS,j ⊂ S , and S is the set of all Sensors in the system
ACS,j ⊂ A , and A is the set of all Actuators in the system
Cond are conditions that relates states of SCS and smetric,i to changes to
state of ACS
Definition 2. We define the capability (Cap) of the attacker as a subset of sen-
sor and actuators that the attacker has control over, meaning that the attacker
is able to manipulate the data received and sent by the component.
Cap = < Sattacker, Aattacker > (3)
where :
Sattacker ⊆ S , and S is the set of all Sensors in the system
Aattacker ⊆ A , and A is the set of all Actuators in the system
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Output for model. From the adversary’s threat intent and capabilities, we
are able to obtain set of sensors, actuators and control statements that are
relevant for modeling the interaction of the attacker with the process dynamics
and control loops :
Smodel = SCS,j ∩ Sattacker,∀j = 1, ...,m
Amodel = ACS,j ∩Aattacker,∀j = 1, ...,m
CSmodel = < sx, a, cond > ∪ < s, ax, cond >, ∀sx ∈ Smodel,∀ax ∈ Amodel
∧a ∈ A ∧ s ∈ S
3.2 Modeling Process System Dynamics
The approach to construct the model of a process system draws inspiration from
System Dynamics, an area of research that aims to understand the behavior
of complex systems over time. With fundamentals of control theory and theory
of non-linear dynamical systems as the foundation of System Dynamics [17], it
is a suitable modeling approach for studying interaction of attacker’s input on
process dynamics.
System Dynamics models actual flow of physical entities or information, reg-
ulated by feedback loops [4]. Tools used to describe the system are Stock and
Flow Diagram (SFD) and Causal Loop Diagrams (CLD). The relationship be-
tween system variables is represented by a CLD, where qualitative analysis of
the dynamics can be performed. The flow and accumulation characteristics can
be studied using a SFD where quantitative analysis can be performed using sim-
ulations. From the output of threat modeling phase, we have a set of Control
Statements which relates sensors and actuators. Sensors in a dynamical systems
measures the stock and flow, whereas the actuators changes these measurements
in the system. In addition, we utilize the inputs from design specifications of the
process system to construct the system model with information of how compo-
nents are physically related such as physical connection and operating parame-
ters that affect stock and flow.
Tank
pump_in
pump_out
level_sensor
Controller
(a) Tank Example
Tank 
pump_in
pump_out
level_sensor
Controller
State 
Representation in
Cyber Realm
(b) Tank example with system state repre-
sentation in ”cyber realm” under attack
Fig. 1. Illustrative Single Tank Example
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We use a simple tank example to illustrate the modeling approach. In Figure
1(a), we have a system comprising of a tank with an inlet pump and an outlet
pump, the level of liquid in the tank is measured by a level sensor. The rate of
inflow and outflow determines the rate of tank level increase and decrease; these
are described by design specifications of these components.
1 # Control Statement 1
2 # tank l e v e l i s high , stop in f l ow and s t a r t out f low
3 i f l e v e l s e n s o r . get ( ) >= l e v e l h i g h :
4 pump in . o f f ( )
5 pump out . on ( )
6
7 # Control Statement 2
8 # tank l e v e l i s low , s t a r t i n f l ow and stop out f low
9 i f l e v e l s e n s o r . get ( ) <= l e v e l l o w :
10 pump in . on ( )
11 pump out . o f f ( )
Listing 1.1. Tank Level Control Strategy
Control statements (Listing 1.1) exists such that the tank level does not rise
or fall below pre-defined levels. This results in causal loops that serves to regulate
the liquid level in the tank. The SFD, together with design specifications of the
system, was used to build a simulation model for quantitative analysis.
Modeling Adversarial Interactions and Physical Impact. Under normal
operation, when there is absence of attacks and faulty components, the state of
the system perceived by the controller is approximately identical to the actual
physical state of the process. However, during adversarial cyber attacks, the per-
ceived states of the system can be manipulated to disrupt the process dynamics
by exploiting control loops to cause the system to react to the perceived state.
During attack, the perceived state of the system by the controller deviates
from the actual physical state and would not be able to detect actual changes to
the physical state caused by control instructions. In order to study the physical
impact of the attacks, there is a need to model both the cyber and physical rep-
resentations of the system. Under normal conditions, the cyber representation is
the duplicate of the physical representation. When under cyber attack, the phys-
ical representation is the actual physical state whereas the cyber representation
is controlled by the attacker.
Using the same tank example, in Figure 1(b), we duplicate the states of
every component. The level sensor measures the actual physical level of the tank
whereas the cyber representation of the sensor is manipulated by the attacker.
The controller perceives the ”cyber realm” system state and give instructions
to actuators that act on the physical process. With both cyber and physical
representations of the system, we are able to study the impact of attacks on
physical process with system state manipulation in cyber realm.
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3.3 Attack Impact Measurement
With the model, we are able to simulate the process dynamics under both sce-
narios of normal conditions and when the system is under attack. To help us
study the interaction of the attacker with the system behavior and understand
the resilience of the system to attacks, it would be important for us to be able
to measure the impact of attack in comparison to normal conditions. In this
section, we discuss two methods of quantifying impact of attack.
Area Between Operational Curves. In many recent studies on resilience
of networked infrastructure such as power systems and Information Technology
systems, resilience is quantified by a time-dependent metric of changes in oper-
ational levels over time [16,15]. Resilience is defined as the ability of the system
to withstand, absorb, adapt to and recover from disturbances to the system [14].
The resilience trapezoid (Figure 2), shows how the operational level changes
over time as it transits through the various phases from original state to system
undergoing disruption, disrupted state, recovery state and recovered state.
Fig. 2. Operational Level F(t), Transition Over Time. Figure from [7]
In our work, since we are able to simulate system performance under both
scenarios of normal and attack conditions, we are able to quantify the impact
of the attack by measuring the divergence of the two curves. This could be
measured using the difference in cumulative area of the normal operating curve
and operating curve when the system is under attack. The operational levels
used to calculate area under graph would be sensor measurements of the actual
physical process (i.e. before duplication of state for cyber representation which
can be manipulated by attacker). The difference in cumulative area will then be
normalized against the area under the normal operating curves, this results in a
value we define as Impact Ratio.
Impact Ratio =
∫ tend
tstart
Fattack(t) dt−
∫ tend
tstart
Fnormal(t) dt∫ tend
tstart
Fnormal(t)dt
(4)
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where :
Fnormal(t) is the operating curve (time-series of operational metric) under
normal operating conditions
Fattack(t) is the operating curve when system is under attack
tstart and tend are start and end times of analysis respectively
In the absence of attacks, there will be no deviation and impact ratio would
be 0, whereas during an attack, the deviation in the two operating curves can
be measured by the magnitude of change in the ratio. A negative ratio indicates
decrease in the measured operational variable whilst under attack, conversely, a
positive ratio indicates an increase in the measured operational variable.
Time to Critical State. Critical states are states where a system’s operational
performance and/or safety has reached an unacceptable level. We can ’measure’
how fast a system can reach the nearest critical state by computing the time-to-
critical-state [3] of the system from a particular time. A longer time-to-critical-
state during an attack would indicate that the system has better capabilities
to withstand the particular system disruption and hence, more resilient to the
particular attack.
4 Model Validation
The approach outlined in Section 3 was applied to model the Secure Water
Treatment Testbed (SWaT) [11] using an attacker model and the operational
specifications of the testbed as inputs. The attacker is assumed to have control
of all the sensors and actuators in the testbed and the attacker’s intention is
to disrupt the flow of water through the testbed such that the treated water
throughput of the plant is affected. As such, the attacker is able to perform
sensor measurement and actuator command spoofing across the whole system to
perform complex attacks that maximises damage. Consequentially, the impact
on safety that arises from attacks such that the attacker’s intention are fulfilled
would be overflowing of tanks and dry running of centrifugal pumps.
4.1 SWaT Model
SWaT is a fully-functional six stage water treatment plant testbed with a through-
put of 5 gallons/min (1.14 m3/hr) of treated water that is primarily used by
researchers to study attacks on ICS infrastructure. Figure 3 provides an overview
of the processes within the water treatment plant and the various components
within each process (LIT : Level Indicator Transmitter, AIT : Analytical Indi-
cator Transmitter, FIT : Flow Indicator Transmitter, P = Pump).
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Fig. 3. Overview of Processes in SWaT. Figure from [11]
4.2 Model Validation Approach
In [11], the work provides historical dataset of the testbed’s state under normal
operating conditions and under various attack scenarios. We utilize the dataset
to validate our model, our model uses the same initial conditions as provided by
the dataset and run the simulation for a stipulated time period. The experiments
to validate are as follows :
1. Normal Operating Conditions for 4 hours
2. Attack 7: Single Stage, Single Point Attack (SSSP) on Process 3’s LIT-301
3. Attack 30: Multi-Stage, Multi-Point Attack (MSMP) on components in Pro-
cess 1 and Process 2
We have only simulated Process 1 to Process 5 as Process 6 serves as a recycle
stage and out of scope of the study of impact on plant operations related to
attacker’s intent and capabilities.
Normal Operations. The model was first validated against historical testbed
data under normal operating conditions for 4 hours. Figures 4 and 5 shows
that the model is able to predict the behavior of the testbed as the trends
due to control strategy of the plant were replicated. However, we observed that
as simulation time increases, the historical plant data lags behind the model
prediction. This was due to the ideal assumptions of the model where state-
switching time (i.e. time to change valve and pump states) is instantaneous and
flows were assumed to be constant at the design specifications. The time lags
due to ideal assumption increases over simulation time, however, this can be
mitigated by running shorter simulation cycles (about 1 hour).
10 Z. Hau et al.
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Fig. 5. Summary of Tank Levels Over 4hrs
Attack 7 : SSSP Attack. Attack 7 from the dataset was used to validate a
single point single stage attack on the testbed. LIT-301 was spoofed to 1200mm
(High High Level), triggering the controllers to close MV-201 and stopping P1
pumps. This would stop flow out of P1 and stop flow into P3, hence we would
expect LIT-101 to increase and LIT 301 to decrease.
From Figure 7(b), it could be observed that at 500s, the attack commenced
and the LIT-301 level was immediately changed to 1200mm, and during the
period of 500s when the level was spoofed, the tank level decreases as no water
enters P3 (no flow in FIT-201) and there is flow out of P3 (indicated by non-zero
flow in FIT-301). From Figures 6(b) and 7(a), FIT-201 flow rate is 0 m3/hr due
to the closure of MV-201, indicating there is no flow out of P1 and hence, an
increase in LIT-101 was observed. When the attack was removed, it was noted
that the model prediction for tank level LIT-301 matches that of the sensor data
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with genuine tank level, indicating that the model was able to predict the actual
physical water tank level during an attack accurately.
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Fig. 7. Summary of Tank Levels Over Duration of SSSP Attack
Attack 30 : MSMP Attack. Attack 30 from the dataset was used to validate
a multi-stage,multi-point attack on the testbed. LIT-101 tank level was spoofed
to a constant level of 700mm , actuator commands were spoofed to keep MV-101
closed, P101 on and MV-201 open. The intended result was to cause Tank 1 to
underflow and Tank 3 to overflow. The model is able to predict the behavior of
attack during the attack, the response of the system of Tank 1 level decreasing
and Tank 3 level increasing (Appendix A, Figure 12(a) and 12(b) respectively)
were accurately predicted. Similarly, our model was able to predict accurately
the actual physical tank level of Tank 1 (LIT-101) while the sensor level was
being spoofed.
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4.3 Summary
In all, the proposed model construction approach based on threat intent and
system design specifications was able to extract relevant control components such
as sensors and actuators and build the dependencies based on control strategies
and system design. By identifying a subset of control variables and components,
the model could be easily constructed, especially for large scale systems where
many components are unessential with respect to the threat model we wish to
analyze. The model was validated and was able to simulate the plant operation
with high accuracy for simulation time of less than an hour. The model allows
us to simulate plant behavior under normal and attack conditions for analysis.
5 Sensitivity Analysis: Cascading Impact of Attacks
With the model validated, we proceed to conduct sensitivity analysis by per-
forming SSSP attacks on P1 and P3 to study the cascading effect of attacks
within the system from attacks that originate from a single point. For our ex-
periments, the attacker’s goal is to decrease the throughput of the system by
stopping flow of water. This could be achieved by spoofing actuator commands
or spoofing sensor values to trick the controllers to change states of actuators
such as valves and pumps to manipulate flow of water in and out of the whole
system or specific processes.
5.1 Vulnerable and Critical States for SWaT
Vulnerable states are states in normal operation which are closest to critical
states and are defined locally (i.e. for sub-processes), whereas critical states
can be either local or global. Global critical states are states where the whole
system’s performance or safety has reached an unacceptable level. For our study,
we investigate an attack’s cascading effects with respect to global performance
critical state where the throughput of the testbed has reached zero.
From the normal operating curves in Figures 4 and 5, we determine the
highest and lowest operating points (i.e. 500mm and 800mm for Tank 1 and
800mm and 1000mm for all other tanks) as the vulnerable states as they are
states closest to the local critical states such as overflow or underflow of tanks.
We use the system state at these specific vulnerable states for the model initial
conditions for sensitivity analysis of data spoofing attacks.
5.2 Time-to-Critical-State From Attack Commencement
The time-to-critical-state is the measure of distance of a system to an unac-
ceptable state. For our experiments, we measure the time-to-critical-state of the
system from the commencement of the attack where the attack location is a local
vulnerable state. The time to critical state would be the time from attack when
there is no flow measured or when there is a safety violation such as overflow or
underflow of tank.
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5.3 Analysis Approach
The cascading effects of attacks would be measured for each process by: 1)
computing the impact ratio of the tank levels and flow rates, and 2) determining
the time-to-critical state from the commencement of an attack. The local impact
of attack would allow us to understand the propagation of attack from a specific
location to other parts of the system.
5.4 Stopping Water Inflow Into System
We first explore the effects of attackers conducting attacks to stop inflow of
water into the system. This can be achieved by: a) spoofing actuator commands
to close inlet valve (MV-101) and, b) spoofing P1 tank level to ”High” to trick
the controller to close the valve. The attacks were conducted at the system’s
first High Vulnerable State and Low Vulnerable State where Tank 1 is at the
highest and lowest normal operating level respectively. The location of attack
is MV-101, the valve that controls water inflow into the system and the flow is
measured by FIT-101.
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Fig. 8. Metrics for Impact of Attacks That Closes MV-101
It was observed that the attack by command injection to turn of MV-101
and spoofing of tank level to ”High” state did not result in any difference in
the impact on the system. The reason was that the control loop that controls
MV-101 acts independently and do not have any other control variables other
than LIT-101. As such, the spoofing of tank level was equivalent to injecting
command to turn off the valve. Operating curves of system under normal and
attack scenarios can be found in Appendix B Figures 13 and 14..
Impact Ratio. The Impact Ratio (Figure 8(a)) of the operational metrics
at the end of the attack shows the magnitude of the attack on the operation.
It was found that for this particular attack, the impact was greatest at the
location of the attack and all ratios were negative, indicating that the decrease
in operational performance is greatest at the point of attack and the magnitude
14 Z. Hau et al.
of impact diminishes downstream. The impact of attack was found to be greater
when the initial state of the system was at the high vulnerable state as compared
to the low vulnerable state, this is due to the additional capacity in the tank
which has to be emptied to result in no flow.
Time-to-critical-state. The time-to-critical-state is the time taken for each
process to reach an unacceptable state. From Figure 8(b), it was observed the
time to reach critical state increases downstream, which was expected from pro-
cesses that are connected sequentially. For the attack when initial state was at the
low vulnerable state, the time-to-critical state was found to be shorter, implying
that the system reaches unacceptable state in a shorter time and consequence
of attack is achieved quicker. It was also observed that the time-to-critical-state
were identical for pairs of processes which do not have tanks (i.e. P1-P2 and
P4-P5), whereas there is an increase in the time for processes with tanks. This
implies that the tanks act as buffer against the impact of attacks.
5.5 Disrupting Flow in System by Manipulating Pump State
The effects of manipulating pump states on the system were explored. Pumps
could be switched off by: a) command spoofing and, b) spoofing tank levels to
trick the controller to send commands to change the pump state. We conduct
these attacks separately for P1 and P3, analysis of the system’s resilience to such
attacks were performed.
Attack on P1 pumps. The location of the attack is at the pumps of P1
where water is removed from Tank 1 (measured by LIT-101) and flow into P2
is measured by FIT-201. The following 3 attacks were conducted: 1) Command
spoofing to switch off pumps, 2) Spoof Tank 1 state to ”Low Low”, and 3) Spoof
Tank 3 state to ”High”. Operating curves of system under normal and attack
scenarios can be found in Appendix B Figures 15 and 16.
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Fig. 9. Metrics for Impact of Attacks That Turns Off Pumps in P1
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It could be observed from Figure 9(b) that the effect of attacks on P1 and
P2 were instantaneous and flow was disrupted. However, due to the tank in P3,
disruption of flow was only observed after the tank was depleted. From Figure
9(a), the impact of attack for command spoofing and spoofing of Tank 3 level
were similar where the impact was largest for FIT-101 and FIT-201. The spoofing
of Tank 1 level resulted in a positive ratio due to the increase in tank level from
the exploitation of control actions to maintain inflow into tank and stop outflow.
Attack on P3 pumps. The location of the attack is at the pumps of P3
where water is removed from Tank 3 (measured by LIT-301) and flow into P4
is measured by FIT-301. The following 3 attacks were conducted: 1) Command
spoofing to switch off pumps, 2) Spoof Tank 3 state to ”Low Low”, and 3) Spoof
Tank 4 state to ”High”. Operating curves of system under normal and attack
scenarios can be found in Appendix B Figures 17 and 18.
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Fig. 10. Metrics for Impact of Attacks That Turns Off Pumps in P3
From Figure 10(b), it could be observed that the effect of attacks on P3
and its preceding processes where instantaneous where flow was halted in these
processes. The time taken for P4 to reach critical state was attributed to the
presence of Tank 4, where its contents had to be depleted. When flow in P4
is disrupted, the downstream process P5 was immediately affected. From the
impact ratio in Figure 10(a), it was found that the impact of attack for command
spoofing and spoofing of Tank 4 level were identical where water flow from P1
to P3 were disrupted. The spoofing of Tank 3 level exploited the control actions
that resulted in continuous inflow into Tank 3 and no outflow, which could be
observed from the positive ratio.
5.6 Summary and Discussion of Design Improvements
Various attacks were simulated on the model of the testbed and the behavior
of the system under attack was analyzed. The cascading effects of attacks on
each process were quantified using the Impact Ratio and the time taken for each
process to reach critical state was measured.
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It was found that processes with tanks have increased ability to withstand
the attack as the time-taken to reach critical state increases in these processes.
The tanks are stored capacity and act as buffer, where normal operation can
continue until the tanks are emptied. To improve the overall system’s ability to
withstand attacks, it is recommended that tanks should be installed for every
process to maximize the buffer to increase the overall time taken to reach a
critical state, providing operators additional time to respond to attacks.
By comparing Figure 9(b) and 10(b), it was observed that the attack on P3,
a later process resulted in shorter time-to-critical-state. This suggests that for
sequentially connected processes, any attacks on later processes would result in
decreased capability to withstand the disruptive effects of attacks, decreasing the
time available for operators to respond. With this knowledge, redundancy could
be introduced for later processes which are critical to operational performance
in order to improve the resiliency of the system.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
Understanding the interaction of the adversary with the physical system and
studying the behavior of system’s response to cyber attacks can help in the
design of defences that improves the systems resilience. To this end, a novel
approach that uses a threat model with an adversary intent and capabilities was
used to determine relevant control variables in a CPS. These control variables,
together with their related control strategies and design specifications were used
to build a model of the CPS. The resulting model was used to study cascading
effects of attacks and analyze the resilience of the CPS to data-oriented attacks.
The proposed modeling approach was demonstrated on an actual water treat-
ment testbed and the model was validated with historical data. The model was
determined to be accurate in simulating the testbed behavior under normal
and attack scenarios. Attacks with the goal to disrupt water flow through the
testbed were simulated and the impact of attack was quantified by measuring
the Impact Ratio and time taken to reach critical state. The cascading effects
of attacks within the system for the various attacks were analyzed and design
enhancements were proposed to address identified weaknesses to improve the
system’s resilience to cyber attacks.
Further work remains for the water treatment testbed model to study the
improvement in resilience from implementing the recommended design changes.
The current work looks into the cascading effects of attacks within a system,
however, CPSs are usually not independent systems but are connected systems-
of-systems (i.e. water treatment plant is connected to a water distribution net-
work). Future research could focus on evaluating cascading effects of attacks on
inter-connected systems.
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Appendix A Operating Curves for Validation of Attack
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Fig. 11. Summary of Flow Over Duration of MSMP Attack
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Fig. 13. Summary of Flow Over Duration of Attack to Close MV-101
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Fig. 14. Summary of Tank Levels Over Duration of Attack to Close MV-101
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Fig. 15. Summary of Flow Over Duration of Attack to Stop Pumps in P1
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Fig. 16. Summary of Tank Levels Over Duration of Attack to Stop Pumps in P1
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Fig. 17. Summary of Flow Over Duration of Attack to Stop Pumps in P3
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Fig. 18. Summary of Tank Levels Over Duration of Attack to Stop Pumps in P3
